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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  It seems that not a week goes by without news reports about yet another company 
or agency suffering a data-security breach: a laptop is lost, a firewall is penetrated, or 
sensitive personal information purportedly kept secure is exposed.  The legal implications 
of such a breach are significant and, given the novelty of both data breaches and the laws 
meant to address them, the ethical implications for an attorney representing a client that 
has suffered such a breach are magnified. 
¶2  This article will explore ethical considerations for attorneys responding to a data-
security breach and the appropriate role for attorneys in a company’s efforts to deal with 
such a breach.  These main topics will be addressed:  (1) the attorney’s role in 
investigating a breach, including the applicability and scope of the attorney-client 
privilege; (2) the applicability and scope of the work-product rule in connection with the 
attorney’s investigation and the company’s response; (3) the attorney’s role and ethical 
obligations with respect to preservation of electronic and documentary evidence as part of 
a breach response; (4) the standards under which an attorney should advise a client 
regarding state and federal data-security breach statutes; and (5) the attorney’s ethical 
obligations during litigation over a data-security breach. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR DATA-SECURITY BREACHES 
¶3 There has been a proliferation of data-security breach incidents in the last few 
years, and many businesses have been required by state statutes or federal regulatory 
schemes to notify individuals whose data have been lost or stolen.  Different types of data 
may be exposed during a data-security breach.  For example, the data at issue could 
include a combination of any of the following: social security numbers, first and last 
names, phone numbers, addresses, banking and investment account numbers, credit 
account numbers, birth dates, medical information, and personal identification numbers 
(PINs). 
¶4 In addition to being an embarrassment for a company, a data-security breach has 
many potential legal implications under both federal and state laws.  For instance, the 
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) establishes 
both criminal penalties for violations of HIPAA’s statutory prohibitions and civil 
penalties for violations of its implementing regulations, including its Privacy Rule and its 
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Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information 
(Security Rule).   The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA)1 2 also may be 
implicated by a data-security breach, as well as the Federal Trade Commission’s unfair 
trade practices rules.3  Many states also have enacted statutes that require businesses 
suffering a data-security breach to notify affected individuals about the breach under 
certain circumstances.  4
¶5 Beyond the statutory and regulatory implications, businesses suffering a data-
security breach also may face civil litigation.  Because this is a new and evolving area of 
law, a company may find itself facing various private causes of action, commonly 
including negligence, breach of contract, infliction of emotional distress, and state 
unlawful trade practices and consumer protection claims.  In addition, there has been a 
recent trend of plaintiffs seeking relief in the form of compensation for future credit 
monitoring, though the viability of such a claim remains unclear.  5
III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND INVESTIGATING A DATA-SECURITY BREACH 
¶6 Companies that experience a data-security breach often will find it useful to employ 
outside counsel and outside information technology (IT) specialists to investigate the 
breach.  If such an investigation is conducted by internal resources, the results of that 
investigation might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-
product privilege. 
¶7 The attorney-client privilege protects communications between an attorney and a 
client.6  The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege is to encourage full communication between attorneys and their 
clients in order to “promote broader public interests in the observance of the law and 
administration of justice.”7  To be protected by the attorney-client privilege, a 
communication must be confidential and made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice 
from the attorney.8  A communication is confidential only if it is not intended to be 
disclosed to third persons; such a disclosure may result in waiver of the privilege.9  In 
addition, the attorney-client privilege is held by the client, not by the lawyer.  10
 
1 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
2 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The 
GLBA protects nonpublic personal information by requiring that financial records be properly secured, 
safeguarded, and eventually disposed of in a manner that completely destroys the information so that it 
cannot be further accessed. 
3 See In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005). 
4 At least 39 states have enacted these notification statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 
(2007); NY GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010 (2007). 
5 For instance, in Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit held 
that Indiana law did not recognize such a claim. 
6 In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1 (SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1994). 
7 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
8 See XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 936 
(8th Cir. 1994); Clover Staffing, LLC v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 238 F.R.D. 576, 578 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006). 
9 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
10 See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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¶8 Communications between in-house counsel and corporate IT professionals may 
themselves be privileged when they meet the subject matter test established by the Court 
in Upjohn Co. v. United States.11  Under Upjohn, the privilege protects communications 
by a corporate employee, regardless of position, when (1) the communications concern 
matters within the scope of the employee’s corporate duties, and (2) the employee is 
aware that the information is being furnished to enable an attorney to provide legal advice 
to the corporation.12  With respect to internal investigations, courts generally have held 
that “an attorney’s investigation [to obtain facts] may constitute a legal service, 
encompassed by the privilege.”13  
¶9 However, courts often apply the protection of the attorney-client privilege more 
narrowly and cautiously to corporate in-house counsel.14   The New York Court of 
Appeals has stated that less protection often is warranted, particularly when company 
officers have a mixed responsibility incorporating both business and legal aspects, and 
where their advice and communications are based on an ongoing, permanent business 
relationship rather than specific requests for legal advice.  15
¶10 Given the often narrow approach taken by courts when addressing whether the 
privilege applies to communications involving in-house counsel, there are significant 
disclosure risks associated with relying solely on in-house counsel to direct an 
investigation.  A common misconception (and frustration) in the corporate world is the 
belief that merely involving in-house counsel protects the information and investigation 
from disclosure in discovery litigation.  As indicated above, this is not always the case.  
In-house attorneys often have both business and legal roles, and advice rendered in that 
business capacity is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Involving in-house 
counsel alone does not mean the information and investigation is necessarily protected 
from disclosure in discovery. 
¶11 The fact that many in-house counsel perform dual roles—as  both corporate officers 
and attorneys—means that confusion often arises when courts are forced to determine 
whether in-house counsel were acting in their business capacity or in their legal capacity. 
This determination often is most difficult when in-house counsel assist with fact-
gathering and regulatory compliance projects; courts in these situations typically must 
resort to evidence other than the face of documents or facts surrounding communications.  
For example, correspondence may contain both business and legal advice.  It is well 
settled, however, that merely sending documents, correspondence, and e-mails to in-
house counsel is not enough to establish privilege.   In addition, there is no presumption 16
 
11 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394. 
12 Id. at 389-90. 
13 In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 601 (4th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 
(9th Cir. 1996) (“Upjohn. . . . make[s it] clear that fact-finding which pertains to legal advice counts as 
‘professional legal services.’”). 
14 See Rossi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989). 
15 Id. 
16 In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 321 n.11 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[E]-mails sent to or from attorneys 
acting in a non-legal capacity, e.g., as CEO, CFO, etc., and that are not addressed to or sent by Defendant’s 
in-house or outside legal counsel should not be privileged . . . . To rule otherwise would allow parties to 
evade the privilege limitations by sending copies of every company-generated e-mail to the company’s 
attorney so as to protect the communication from discovery, regardless of whether legal services were 
sought or who the other recipients of the e-mail were.”). 
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that communications are privileged, and the party asserting the attorney-client privilege 
has the burden of establishing all of the required elements.  17
¶12 In the context of a data-breach investigation, these issues can become especially 
difficult given the complex technical issues involved.  The distinction between legal 
advice and technical, business-related advice will be more obvious to the court when the 
advice comes from outside counsel. 
IV. THE WORK-PRODUCT RULE AND INVESTIGATING A DATA-SECURITY BREACH 
¶13 In addition to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product rule also may protect 
an investigation into a data-security breach.  In particular, when a business hires an 
outside firm to investigate a breach incident and to advise the business regarding risk 
mitigation that advice and investigation should qualify for protection under the work-
product rule.  The rule is “designed to balance the needs of the adversary system: 
promotion of an attorney’s preparation in representing a client versus society’s general 
interest in revealing all true and material facts to the resolution of a dispute.”18  In federal 
courts, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) protects attorney work product from 
discovery.19  The work-product rule was created to protect trial preparation materials that 
might reveal an attorney’s evaluations and strategies about a case.  20
¶14 The two types of materials covered by the rule are opinion work product and 
ordinary work product. Opinion work product consists of mental impressions, opinions, 
conclusions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party.21  This 
encompasses an attorney’s notes (including purely factual notes), documents reflecting 
strategy discussions and evaluation of cases, compilations of documents that would 
disclose an attorney’s mental impressions and thought processes, and the organization of 
the attorney’s file.22  In contrast, ordinary work product, including raw factual 
information, consists of preparation materials that do not disclose opinions or 
impressions.  23
¶15 Under the Federal Rules, the two types of work product receive different levels of 
protection. Opinion work product is generally entitled to greater protection than ordinary 
work product and typically is not subject to discovery.24  Ordinary work product can be 
discoverable, but usually only if the party seeking discovery can show a substantial need 
for the materials and an inability to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
some other means.   25
 
17 United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000). 
18 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir.1988).   
19 See, e.g., United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 966 (3d Cir. 1988). 
20 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
22 See Director, Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, 124 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988); Shelton v. Am. Motors 
Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (8th Cir. 1986). 
23 In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 2007). 
24 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003).  
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
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¶16 The scope of the work-product rule extends to materials prepared by, for, or in 
consultation with an attorney.26  However, as with the attorney-client privilege, the dual 
roles of many in-house counsels—as both corporate officers and attorneys—may leave 
the reports of internal investigations open to disclosure in discovery. The applicability of 
the work-product rule also generally turns on whether the work was performed “in 
anticipation of litigation.”27 Under federal law, “in anticipation of litigation means only 
that the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in 
possible future litigation.”28 The prevalence of lawsuits in connection with data-security 
breaches lends credence to a claim that any information gathered or acquired by an 
attorney in connection with a data breach was gathered or acquired in anticipation of 
litigation.  The hiring of an outside counsel makes a clear statement that the company 
sought legal advice in anticipation of potential litigation. In contrast, a corporation 
turning to the advice of in-house counsel may find it more difficult to establish that the 
consultation was in anticipation of litigation. It should be noted, however, that “the 
collection of evidence, without any creative or analytic input by an attorney or his agent, 
does not qualify [for] work-product [protections].”  29
¶17 While the work-product rule does not shield underlying facts or event information 
from discovery, the compilations and collections performed by an attorney or an 
attorney’s team would probably be protected from disclosure in discovery. But ordinary 
business documents — those that would have been prepared by a company or third party 
regardless of whether an attorney was sent a copy — are not protected by the doctrine.  
Specifically, “documents created for a business purpose are not protected even though the 
‘information developed may be helpful [to the company] in legal proceedings.’”30  Like 
the attorney-client privilege, the protections of the work-product rule can be waived by 
disclosing the materials to third parties.31  In addition, the protections afforded by the rule 
may be waived if the work-product privilege is not asserted promptly.    32
¶18  
V. RESPONDING TO A DATA-SECURITY BREACH — THE ATTORNEY’S ETHICAL 
OBLIGATIONS AND ROLE 
¶19 When a data-security breach occurs, evidence should be preserved and collected 
diligently.  It is critical to document what the client was doing at the time of the breach 
incident in order to comply with ethical and discovery obligations. Attorneys have an 
ethical obligation to ensure that their clients avoid possible court sanctions for spoliation 
 
26 Id. See also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658 at 667-68.  
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
28 Clover Staffing, LLC v. Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc., 238 F.R.D. 576, 579 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(quoting Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 354, 357 (E.D. Tex. 1999)). 
29 Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, 158 F.R.D. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
30 Clover Staffing, 238 F.R.D. at 579 (citing Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 220 F.R.D. 467, 
473 (N.D. Tex. 2004)).  
31 See Norton v. Caremark, Inc., 20 F.3d 330, 339 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no abuse of discretion by trial 
court admitting into evidence previously protected documents, which defendant counsel disclosed to 
plaintiff during pre-trial discovery). 
32 Marx v. Kelly, Hart & Hallman, P.C., 929 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1991).  
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of evidence.  Also, litigants have an obligation to preserve relevant evidence for use by 
the adverse party. 
¶20 Spoliation poses a significant danger in responding to a data breach. A finding of 
spoliation can result in substantial court sanctions, including a jury instruction that jurors 
should infer that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the offending party.  
Generally, an adverse inference instruction is given when evidence has been destroyed 
and: 
(1) . . . the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it 
at the time it was destroyed; (2) . . . the records were destroyed “with a culpable 
state of mind;” and (3) . . . the destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party’s 
claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would 
support that claim or defense.33
¶21 The rationale for the adverse inference rule is predicated on the “common sense 
observation that a party who has notice that [evidence] is relevant to litigation and who 
proceeds to destroy [the evidence] is more likely to have been threatened by [that 
evidence] than is a party in the same position who does not destroy the document.”34  
Such an instruction can be extremely damaging to a litigant’s case, and may be far worse 
than the inference that the jury would have drawn if the evidence had been produced. 
¶22 Courts also have the authority to grant an adverse inference instruction even where 
a party did not intentionally destroy the evidence.  In cases where a party merely 
neglected to preserve evidence relevant to the case, the jury still could be instructed that it 
may infer that the unproduced evidence was damaging to that party’s case and supportive 
of the adverse party’s claims.35  It is also important to recognize that spoliation sanctions 
can apply to destruction of electronic information, regardless of whether the destruction 
was intentional.36 When responding to a data breach, attorneys therefore may want to 
have a computer forensics expert on their investigative team to make certain that all the 
electronic information is properly preserved. 
¶23 It is important to document all the client’s actions taken in connection with, and in 
response to, an incident. As mentioned above, these documents prepared in anticipation 
of litigation should be protected by the work-product privilege.37  It is also important to 
identify appropriate law enforcement contacts to notify regarding security incidents that 
may involve illegal activities.  An attorney should be involved in making this assessment. 
 
33 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Byrnie v. 
Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107-12 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
34 Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982).   
35 See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding error by the trial 
court in completely barring expert’s testimony where spoliation inference may have been the more 
appropriate sanction). 
36 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806-07 (7th Cir. 1995); Marrocco v. General 
Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 224-25 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Graham, 363 B.R. 32, 36 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007). 
37 See Work Product discussion, supra page 174. 
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VI. STATUTORY NOTIFICATION — ADVISING CLIENTS REGARDING 
NEW STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
¶24 While data-security breach issues are of concern to every individual interacting 
with modern technology, it is only within the past few years that many states have 
enacted statutory schemes that address data-security breach and identity theft.38  As a 
result, there is very little state or federal case law interpreting the scope or application of 
these statutes.39  In an effort to ensure compliance with the new laws and regulations, an 
attorney should be involved in assessing whether a company is required to give notice in 
each state where it does business or where a potential loss of data may have occurred. 
¶25 It is also important to determine, upon advice of counsel, how notice must be given, 
when notice should be given, the form notice should take, and the specific contents of 
any notice.  States vary in their definition of what constitutes “personal information.”40  
Therefore, it is critical to ascertain what a state’s statute defines as personal information 
in order to determine if the breach is one giving rise to the notice requirement, and if so, 
the statutory requirement for how notice should be given. 
¶26 When giving advice about statutes that have yet to be authoritatively interpreted, 
attorneys should be particularly careful.  While an attorney generally is not liable for 
malpractice “for a mistake in a point of law which has not been settled by the court of last 
resort in his State and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed 
lawyers,”41 an attorney in such circumstances must be able to demonstrate that he or she 
acted in good faith “and in an honest belief that his advice and acts are well founded and 
in the best interest of his client.”42  To meet this standard, research should include 
legislative history when available, because if the language of the statute is ambiguous or 
confusing, a reading of the legislative materials may provide insight as to how to 
approach a new law or regulation.43  Research also should be expanded to encompass 
decisions regarding similar statutes in other jurisdictions.   A client also should be 44
 
38 See supra note 4. 
39 See, e.g., Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. C 06-04857, 2006 WL 2917604, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 11, 2006) (“Several of plaintiffs’ claims implicate complicated issues of financial privacy on which the 
California courts have yet to rule.  Plaintiffs brought claims under California Civil Code §§ 1798.181.5(b), 
1798.81.5(c), 1798.81, and 1798.82, provisions of the financial-privacy regime enacted by the California 
legislature over the last six years.  There appears to be no reported appellate decisions interpreting these 
code provisions.”). 
40 For instance, in Connecticut, personal information includes a person’s first name or first initial and 
last name, along with one of the following unencrypted pieces of information: social security number; 
driver’s license number or state identification number; or account number, credit card number, or debit card 
number, combined with any password, security code, or access code. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(a) 
(2007).  Several states use a similar definition. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2007); TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.002, 48.103 (2007).  Other states, however, have chosen to include additional 
information in their statutory definitions, including medical information and security codes.  See, e.g., CAL. 
CIVIL CODE, § 1798.82(e) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(6) (year?). 
41 Jerry's Enter., Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 711 N.W.2d 811, 818 (Minn. 2006) 
(quoting Meagher v. Kavli, 97 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1959)).   
42 Id. 
43 United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Where the statutory language does not 
express Congress’s intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to the legislative history and the 
atmosphere in which the statute was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional purpose.”); Dir., 
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Sun Ship, Inc., 150 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 1998) (“If the [statutory] 
language is ambiguous, we look to legislative history to determine congressional intent.”). 
44 See, e.g., Martinez v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“Where, 
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advised that public agencies are frequently the plaintiff in an action brought pursuant to a 
data-breach notification statute, and that the agency’s opinion regarding statutory 
requirements is generally accorded deference by courts.45  Opinion letters should contain 
caveats notifying the client that this is a new and unpredictable area of litigation. 
VII. THE ATTORNEY’S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS DURING LITIGATION 
OVER A DATA-SECURITY BREACH 
¶27 Lawsuits over data-security breaches are becoming more common, and because 
most of the information in such cases is stored in electronic form, the cases present 
significant challenges for counsel.  As in any other case, initial disclosures under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 must be signed by an attorney, certifying that, after reasonable 
inquiry, the disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made.46  Discovery 
obligations also require a signature by an attorney, certifying compliance with the rules, 
warranted by the law or a good faith argument for extension, not interposed for an 
improper purpose, and not unreasonably or unduly burdensome.47  Attorneys are also 
subject to sanctions if these certifications are made in violation of the rules.48  Attorneys 
have a duty to supplement disclosures and discovery responses under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(e) as well. 
¶28 The new e-discovery rules raise additional issues and obligations.  Attorneys are 
advised to include IT personnel as part of the discovery team in light of the new rules 
because they can assist counsel in making certain that all information is collected and 
reviewed.  Prior to the codification of guidelines regarding electronic discovery in 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 34, and 37 (effective December 1, 2006), the federal 
courts addressed a litigant’s obligations with respect to preservation and production of 
electronic evidence on a case-by-case basis.  Now Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) 
establishes the so-called “safe harbor” for electronic discovery: “[a]bsent exceptional 
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing 
to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system.”  49
 
as here, there is no California case directly on point, foreign decisions involving similar statutes and similar 
factual situations are of great value to the California courts.”); Pope v. Brock, 912 So.2d 935, 938 (Miss. 
2005) (“[U]nder the ‘Borrowed Statute’ doctrine, we may consider a sister state’s interpretation of its 
statutes where there is clear evidence that our Legislature consciously borrowed statutory language from 
that state’s enactment.”); Murray v. New Hampshire Div. of State Police, 913 A.2d 737, 740 (N.H. 2006) 
(“We also look to the decisions of other jurisdictions, since other similar acts, because they are in pari 
materia, are interpretatively helpful, especially in understanding the necessary accommodation of the 
competing interests involved.”) (quoting Union Leader Corp. v. New Hampshire Hous. Fin. Auth., 705 
A.2d 725, 730 (N.H. 1997)). 
45 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (agency 
interpretation of governing statutes is entitled to deference); In re Dir. of Prop. Valuation, 161 P.3d 755, 
761 (Kan. 2007) (deference given to interpretation made by agency charged with enforcing statute); Racine 
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of Hearings, 717 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Wis. 2006) (The “court may accord 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute great weight deference or due weight deference.”). 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1). 
47 Id. 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
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¶29 Care should be taken to remember that a “safe harbor” is not always safe.  In 
reality, an attorney still has an ethical obligation to avoid a spoliation problem with 
electronic records.  It is commonly understood that destroying relevant evidence after 
entry of a federal court order requiring its production to the adverse party will support 
severe sanctions.50  While Rule 37(e) appears to provide a safe harbor protecting the 
party against sanctions for the routine destruction of electronic evidence except in 
exceptional circumstances, the committee notes for the rule qualify that language.  The 
committee notes provide that: 
Rule 37(f) [sic] applies only to information lost due to the "routine operation of 
an electronic information system"—the ways in which such systems are 
generally designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party's technical 
and business needs. The "routine operation" of computer systems includes the 
alteration and overwriting of information, often without the operator's specific 
direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy 
documents. Such features are essential to the operation of electronic information 
systems.51
¶30 Accordingly, data loss that is not due to routine operation of a system may lead to a 
spoliation sanction.  The committee notes also emphasize that for the safe harbor 
provision to apply, the loss of evidence must have been in good faith.  52
¶31 Therefore, the rule should not be interpreted in absolute terms because the inclusion 
of a requirement of good faith places the issue of the reasonableness of the party’s 
conduct squarely before the court for its determination.  Further, the scope of the new 
safe harbor exception in practice remains to be clarified by litigation under the new rule.  
It would therefore be unwise to interpret this rule as broad-case immunity against 
sanctions for the routine destruction of electronic evidence.  The committee notes also 
leave unanswered the question of whether the courts are to apply a subjective or an 
objective standard in determining if the party against whom sanctions were sought acted 
in good faith.  For example, if an objective standard is applied, the professed good faith 
of the spoliator would not be controlling.  Attorneys should keep in mind that even in the 
absence of a court order, litigants have an obligation to preserve relevant evidence for use 
by the adverse party.53  Furthermore, when a party causes “the destruction or significant 
alteration of evidence, or . . . fail[s] to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in 
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation,” it is guilty of spoliation.  54
¶32 Because e-discovery compliance is an emerging topic, the courts are still sorting 
out which categories of data are necessary for litigation.  For example, a federal court in 
California held that data stored in a computer’s random access memory (RAM) is 
electronically stored information that must be turned over in litigation, despite the fact 
that RAM is not permanent storage and is continually being updated, changed, deleted, or 
 
50 See Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355, 2006 WL 2349459, at *8-11 (E.D. La. 
2006). 
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) Committee Notes (2006). 
52 Id. 
53 Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). 
54 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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overwritten in business computers.55  Attorneys also should make sure they are familiar 
with any specific document retention obligations for their client’s industry, such as 
regulations by the Securities and Exchange Commission that require a broker-dealer to 
maintain records of electronic communications for a certain time period.56  A private 
litigant in a federal civil action seeking such information due to its relevance in his or her 
case has no private right of action under industry record-keeping rules. However, there is 
a strong argument in federal court that a document retention policy is unreasonable as a 
matter of law if it allows for the destruction of potentially useful evidence that a party 
was required by law to independently maintain.  57
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶33 Attorneys should be wary when dealing with this relatively new area of the law.  
Because the results of a data-breach investigation may be critical in subsequent litigation, 
attorneys must be careful to make certain that those results are protected from discovery.  
Until courts have definitively interpreted the state and federal laws and regulations 
applicable to data-security breaches, attorneys should be especially prudent when 
advising clients regarding the proper course of action.  Counsel should assemble a team 
that includes IT professionals to make certain that all relevant information is collected, 
analyzed, and preserved.  Attorneys also should not rely exclusively on the new “safe 
harbor” discovery provision when responding to e-discovery requests. 
 
55 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
56 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-06 (2008). 
57 Cf. United States. v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) (spoliation argument 
rejected where defendant destroyed documents in compliance with state regulations). 
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